
Dr. Srinath Sridharan is a Corporate Advisor & Independent Director on Corporate Boards. He is the author of ‘Family and Dhanda’.
November 17, 2026 at 4:13 AM IST
The Reserve Bank of India’s decision to seek a review of the Supreme Court’s October 15, 2026 judgment in the Yes Bank Additional Tier-1 bond dispute deserves attention well beyond the fate of ₹84.15 billion of securities. The RBI has a legitimate interest in defending its powers.
But were its processes sufficiently rigorous?
The write-down triggered petitions in the Madras and Bombay High Courts, Supreme Court appeals and review petitions by Yes Bank and the RBI. The Bombay High Court set aside the write-down in January 2023.
The Supreme Court upheld that decision, followed by a contempt petition over restoration. Six years after the rescue, the legal consequences remain contested. What does this reveal about the preparation behind decisions of such consequence?
Institutional Gaps
AT-1 instruments are designed to absorb losses when a bank’s capital position deteriorates. The issue was whether the administrator had authority under the final scheme to write down the bonds.
The draft scheme contained an express write-down provision, omitted from the final scheme notified on March 13, 2020. The Supreme Court held that the administrator could not assume a power belonging to the RBI when the final scheme did not confer that authority. The Court criticised the RBI as a bystander as Yes Bank’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio deteriorated, and questioned the sale of these instruments to individual investors.
How did an omission with such consequences survive the reconstruction process? Who examined the legal effect of removing the write-down provision? Urgency can explain speed. It cannot establish who was legally authorised to act, or whether the final instrument recorded that authority. These clauses determine who bears losses and who may impose them. An investor’s acceptance of risk cannot validate a write-down by an unauthorised actor. How should the system protect both propositions?
There is an accounting dimension. One assumes that the RBI would have sought independent accounting advice, probably from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India itself. The Banking Regulation Act allows committees with accountancy expertise to assist an administrator.
Such expertise could have tested the accounting treatment and capital implications. But an accounting opinion can clarify financial consequences. It cannot create statutory authority where the law or notified scheme does not provide it. The question extends beyond accounting oversight to the allocation and exercise of legal power.
Reviewing Regulators
The case raises questions about reviewing regulators’ decisions. The RBI exercises extensive powers over banks. Yet there is no general appellate tribunal for RBI regulatory and supervisory decisions comparable to the Securities Appellate Tribunal, which hears appeals against specified orders of the Securities and Exchange Board of India.
The RBI’s responsibilities have wide coverage and are demanding. But when decisions affect institutions, investors and markets, how should their legality be examined? Is recourse to constitutional courts the only meaningful avenue? Does the absence of a broader appellate mechanism matter, or does the existing framework provide adequate safeguards? These questions merit consideration without assuming that one model can be transplanted.
Judicial review is essential where statutory power and private rights intersect. Do existing pathways provide the specialist understanding and timely resolution complex financial disputes require?
The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, chaired by Justice B. N. Srikrishna, proposed a Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal. Does the experience of the intervening years justify revisiting the questions that informed it? Markets and regulatory responsibilities have evolved. Do the arrangements for reviewing regulatory decisions deserve fresh examination?
Beyond Yes Bank
The judgment was specific to the scheme and statutory framework before the Court, not a general rejection of the RBI’s crisis-management powers. Its reasoning may inform future disputes involving delegated powers, regulatory frameworks and administrative discretion, although each case will turn on its own facts and law. The Court also stated that its observations were confined to the appeals before it and should not influence pending proceedings.
If the RBI succeeds in its review, the judgment may be modified or clarified, strengthening its position on the scope of its powers. If the review is rejected, the existing judgment will continue to carry weight in disputes involving comparable questions of statutory authority and process.
Would this encourage investors and regulated entities to challenge other decisions? Possibly, although each case would turn on its own legal and factual circumstances. Will regulators now subject the legal architecture of interventions to greater scrutiny before acting?
The RBI has faced significant judicial challenges before. The Supreme Court set aside its 2018 circular restricting banking services to cryptocurrency businesses in the Internet and Mobile Association of India case in 2020. The dispute involving Uday Kotak and promoter shareholding dilution followed a different route, principally through the Bombay High Court.
Their legal foundations differ and should not be collapsed into a pattern of defeats. Yet they raise a question about how a regulator responds when its interpretation of its own rules is contested.
There is an unfortunate asymmetry in this prolonged litigation. It is damaging for the regulator, unsettling for investors and expensive for the banking system. For lawyers, however, it is a rather different proposition. Years of proceedings, appeals, contempt petitions and review applications can translate into substantial professional fees. As uncertainty continues, the legal meter keeps running. Everyone else waits for clarity while the bill continues to grow.
The RBI is right to defend the authority required to preserve financial stability. Hesitation in a systemic crisis can impose far greater costs on the economy. Its authority rests, however, on credible decisions, precise legal instruments and accountability.
Defending that authority is worth every penny spent on litigation. Parts of the market may read the review petition as an attempt to preserve the RBI’s final say over regulatory interpretation and intervention. That perception deserves consideration, though it does not capture the full case for review.
Can the system preserve regulatory freedom, keep administrators within their statutory mandates, protect investors and provide credible scrutiny when serious questions arise? When decisions of great consequence repeatedly reach constitutional courts, should each episode be treated as a self-contained legal dispute, or should policymakers and the financial sector ask whether the institutional framework itself deserves another look? The case will be decided on its merits. The questions it has brought into view could have a longer life for policymakers.