Banking Regulation: Is the Timing of the Accounting Reset Right?

The market's new formula for amortisation of held-to-maturity bonds has reopened the debate over the RBI's transition to fair-value accounting. The issue is not merely how legacy investments should be valued, but why the change is being made now.

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Reserve Bank of India Building, Mumbai
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By R. Gurumurthy

Gurumurthy, ex-central banker and a Wharton alum, managed the rupee and forex reserves, government debt and played a key role in drafting India's Financial Stability Reports.

November 16, 2026 at 10:47 AM IST

Banks are exploring an alternative to the Reserve Bank of India's proposed fair-value reset of their legacy Held-to-Maturity, or HTM, investments. According to a report in The Economic Times, the Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association is expected to propose a yield-based amortisation method to the RBI. 

This would use the original purchase yield to determine a bond's carrying value over its remaining life, instead of subjecting legacy holdings to a one-time fair-value adjustment on March 31, 2027.

Under the RBI's new requirements, the fair value of HTM securities outstanding on March 31, 2027, will become their new gross carrying amount from April 1, 2027. The difference from the previous carrying amount, net of applicable taxes, will be adjusted against Revenue or General Reserve rather than routed through the profit and loss account. 

Though this is a one-time adjustment and not a requirement for periodic mark-to-market valuation of HTM securities, it could reduce banks' reserves and potentially constrain capital headroom.

The market's proposal seeks to avoid this immediate adjustment by recognising the premium or discount progressively through interest income. It is understandable from the banks' perspective, particularly when rising bond yields have depressed market prices. 

But it raises a larger question: should accounting rules accommodate the economics of holding securities to maturity, or recognise their market value irrespective of a bank's intention to sell?

The RBI's move must be seen against the history of its treatment of HTM investments. The category allows banks to carry securities at amortised cost, provided they genuinely intend and are able to hold them to maturity. A temporary decline in market value does not necessarily translate into a realised loss if the issuer honours its obligations and the bank does not need to sell.

During the pandemic, the RBI enhanced the permitted HTM limit from 19.5% to 23%of net demand and time liabilities for specified eligible securities. With government borrowing rising sharply, the dispensation enabled banks to absorb additional government securities without exposing themselves to immediate MTM volatility. It was subsequently extended and phased back by March 2025.

Changing Rules
In September 2023, the RBI announced a revised investment-portfolio framework, effective April 2024. It removed the ceiling on HTM holdings, tightened rules governing transfers into and out of HTM and strengthened disclosures. 

More significantly, its transition provisions for existing HTM securities prescribed acquisition cost adjusted for amortisation of premium or discount as the new carrying value, with fair value permitted only in exceptional circumstances where the calculation was impracticable. The RBI thus consciously retained the amortised-cost approach for legacy HTM holdings even while overhauling the investment framework. 

The question then is what has changed since 2023 to make a different transition treatment necessary.

The requirement appeared in the RBI's April 2026 amendments, consequent upon its new Asset Classification, Provisioning and Income Recognition Directions. From April 2027, banks will move to an Expected Credit Loss framework and an Effective Interest Rate, or EIR, method. 

ECL makes provisioning more forward-looking, while EIR provides a consistent basis for recognising interest income over an instrument's life. A common opening measurement may be necessary to integrate legacy investments into the new framework. The investment adjustment is also part of a wider transition that prescribes fair-value measurement for the loan portfolio.

But the rationale for modernising accounting does not automatically settle the question of timing. Why was the reset not incorporated when the investment framework was revised in 2023? Could it have been introduced earlier, when interest rates were lower and valuation differences might have been less onerous? Why must accumulated differences be recognised at a single transition date when market yields may be moving in the opposite direction?

There may be practical reasons. ECL and EIR require banks to develop models, systems, data and governance arrangements. A common commencement date may simplify implementation and prevent legacy values from distorting the new framework. These are legitimate considerations. But the RBI has not publicly explained why the fair-value reset cannot be phased or why April 2027 is essential.

Prudential Balance
The distinction between accounting value and economic value is important. 

A bond purchased at a yield of 7% may trade at a discount when market yields rise. A bank intending and able to hold it to maturity may not suffer a cash loss. Yet the discount reflects the opportunity cost of being locked into a lower yield and becomes relevant if liquidity needs force a sale. Ignoring that exposure does not eliminate the risk; recognising it does not necessarily mean a realised loss.

Silicon Valley Bank's failure in 2023 illustrates the point. Rising rates created substantial unrealised losses in its securities portfolio. Its collapse, however, involved concentrated uninsured deposits, interest-rate and liquidity risks, management failures and supervisory shortcomings. HTM accounting did not cause the failure, nor would routine MTM alone necessarily have prevented it. Supervisors must look beyond accounting classifications to understand the underlying risks.

The answer is neither indiscriminate MTM nor a return to historical-cost accounting. Accounting stability has a legitimate role, but it cannot substitute for supervisory visibility of duration, liquidity and interest-rate risks. Equally, better accounting should not become an exercise in crystallising accumulated valuation differences without explaining the timing and alternatives.

The RBI is entitled to modernise its prudential framework. But having previously used HTM flexibility to protect banks from market volatility, one wonders why accumulated valuation differences now require recognition at this particular juncture. If 2027 is dictated by the architecture of ECL and EIR, that case should be made transparently. If a phased transition or yield-based alternative is feasible, its rejection deserves an explanation.

The issue is not whether banks should be spared the consequences of investment decisions. It is whether the regulator has chosen the most prudent way and the most appropriate time to recognise them.