The Other Side of the FCNR(B) Story

A surge in NRI deposits alongside a large outward credit flow raises questions about how much borrowed money helped finance the FCNR deposit boom

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By V Thiagarajan

Venkat Thiagarajan is a currency market veteran.

November 17, 2026 at 6:26 AM IST

The balance of payments data for April–September 2026 show a striking $125.6 billion net increase in NRI deposits under banking capital liabilities. This figure, dominated by FCNR(B) deposits mobilised during the RBI’s special swap window, represents one of the largest such inflows on record.

Simultaneously, the data record an unprecedented $51.4 billion positive net flow under “ECB By India”—a category capturing net outward commercial lending and asset extensions by Indian entities.

Together, these figures raise an important analytical question: how much of the headline deposit growth reflects genuine, unleveraged NRI savings, and how much may have been amplified by leveraged structures, and what risks may be embedded within those positions.

The Mechanics of Leveraged FCNR(B) Gross-Ups
The sharp rise in FCNR(B) deposits during the swap-window period may not represent a one-for-one increase in unleveraged NRI savings.

A meaningful portion of the mobilisation appears to have been supported by leveraged structures involving domestic banks, their overseas branches, foreign lenders and GIFT City IFSC banking units.

In a typical arrangement, an NRI contributes a relatively small equity tranche and obtains foreign-currency financing secured against an FCNR(B) deposit through direct liens, guarantees or standby letters of credit.

The borrowed funds are combined with the investor’s own capital and placed into the FCNR(B) deposit, which is then pledged as collateral for the loan.

Reading the Balance of Payments Numbers
The $125.6 billion recorded under “NRI Deposits (Net)” captures the increase in Indian banks’ foreign-currency liabilities to non-residents.

Where financing is arranged through foreign lenders, overseas branches, or GIFT City IBUs (which are treated as non-residents under FEMA), the deposit enters India’s domestic BoP reporting perimeter in full, while the matching funding leg sits largely outside it. In these cases, the deposit inflow is visible, but the leverage leg is not.

If FCNR(B) deposits were created with leverage, facilitated by the Indian banks as is widely presumed, we would expect the corresponding credit exposure to appear somewhere in the financial system.

If Indian banks directly extended cross-border credit, funded overseas branches or provided guarantees supporting these trades, the matching asset exposure would typically appear in banking-sector foreign assets, cross-border lending accounts or other outward-credit categories.

The Striking $51.4 Billion “ECB By India” Figure
The aggregate data clearly capture the deposit inflow and highlight the unusual $51.4 billion “ECB By India (Net) “ entry. This positive net aggregate reflects outward credit and asset deployment by Indian entities. India has rarely recorded outward commercial lending of this magnitude in a single six-month period, let alone on a sustained basis.

The category itself is broad. It might include outward commercial credit, trade-related credit, treasury operations of overseas branches and other external asset exposures. It therefore cannot be deemed a pure measure of FCNR-related lending.

Nevertheless, the simultaneous appearance of a record $125.6 billion NRI deposit inflow and an exceptionally large $51.4 billion outward credit figure is highly suggestive. It is easy, and analytically tempting, to assume that a substantial portion, or even the bulk, of the $51.4 billion was used to fund the leveraged leg of the FCNR (B) deposits.

The unprecedented scale of the outflow and its precise coincidence with the deposit surge make that inference natural.

The prudent reading is that a meaningful share of the outflow was likely connected to FCNR leverage, while recognising that the full amount cannot be attributed solely to these structures on the basis of aggregate statistics alone.

Where leverage was employed, the corresponding financing exposure would be expected to appear within banking capital assets or ECB-related categories, or outside the domestic balance of payments perimeter altogether.

Until granular information becomes available, the most accurate interpretation is that the $125.6 billion figure contains both genuine inflows and leverage-supported deposits, and that the simultaneous $51.4 billion outward credit flow is consistent with, though not conclusive proof of, significant leverage having been employed.

If a substantial portion of the $51.4 billion 'ECB By India' outflow indeed represents the financing leg of leveraged FCNR(B) structures, borrowers may effectively carry as much as $51.4 billion of foreign-currency liabilities against a corresponding stock of FCNR(B) deposits. Because FCNR(B) deposits typically lock in fixed returns while external commercial borrowings are predominantly floating-rate, these positions could embed a significant interest-rate mismatch.

The $51.4 billion “ECB By India” item is a potentially important clue, but not conclusive proof.