The Investment Compact India Must Now Rebuild Together

Tax relief can improve returns, but cannot command investment. India’s next investment cycle depends on demand, institutional confidence and the quality of public policy.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the AGM of FICCI, November 19,2026
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By Srinath Sridharan

Dr. Srinath Sridharan is a Corporate Advisor & Independent Director on Corporate Boards. He is the author of ‘Family and Dhanda’.

November 20, 2026 at 4:13 AM IST

The Prime Minister’s challenge to corporate India raises a legitimate question: why have stronger profits, healthier balance sheets and lower corporate tax rates not produced a commensurate revival in private investment, employment and wages? India needs businesses willing to invest, innovate, manufacture and create productive jobs. The policy debate must distinguish what governments can enable from what companies must decide.

The investment record deserves scrutiny.

Private investment has recovered more slowly than public capital expenditure, even as corporate balance sheets have strengthened and banking-sector stress has receded. The private corporate sector’s share of total investment fell from above 40% in 2016 to about 34% in 2024. This is a policy concern, but it cannot be explained by treating tax relief as an obligation to invest.

A lower corporate tax rate improves post-tax returns and can strengthen the economics of a project. A tax concession is a policy instrument, not a political IOU.  It does not oblige a company to deploy every rupee saved into new capacity, hire a prescribed number of workers or raise salaries by a predetermined amount.

The government must assess whether the concession generated additional investment, employment and productivity. If outcomes disappoint, the design and effectiveness of the incentive deserve examination. The government remains accountable for the results of its policy.

Capital Allocation Remains a Boardroom Fiduciary Responsibility
Investment requires boards to assess order books, capacity utilisation, financing costs, technology, execution capability and expected returns. Listed companies also owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, including dispersed investors.

A board approving an uneconomic project chiefly to signal confidence in government priorities would be failing in its duty. Political leadership can set national ambitions, but cannot replace commercial judgement. Boards must explain why they invest, defer or reject a proposal.

Corporate Profitability does not Compel Capacity Expansion
Higher profits improve a company’s ability to invest. They do not prove that new capacity is needed. A business may have under-utilised plants, weak orders or technology changing faster than its investment cycle. Cash may be better used to reduce debt, modernise, fund research or acquire capabilities.

India has lived through the consequences of investment ahead of viable demand. The earlier cycle of excessive leverage, surplus capacity and impaired bank assets remains a warning. The objective is productive investment earning sustainable returns, not capital expenditure undertaken to demonstrate political enthusiasm.

Demand Visibility Must Precede New Investment
Tax relief can improve supply-side economics. It cannot create customers. A manufacturer considering a new plant needs confidence in future orders, household purchasing power, export access and its ability to compete. When demand is uncertain, deferral may be prudent.

Aggregate growth can conceal uneven consumption. Strong premium spending does not necessarily indicate equivalent demand across mass-market categories. Private investment therefore depends on the breadth and quality of growth, including reliable employment and rising real incomes. Demand must sit at the centre of any serious account of weak capital expenditure.

Corporate India has no Single Investment Profile
A conglomerate, mid-sized manufacturer, family enterprise, exporter, technology company and infrastructure developer face different constraints. Their access to finance, markets and technology varies, as do their regulatory burdens.

For many mid-sized firms, the difficulty is scaling a viable business across locations and markets. They face compliance costs, uneven access to patient credit, limited legal capacity and multiple administrative systems. A tax reduction may help a large profitable company while leaving a smaller firm’s uncertain orders and costly working capital untouched.

Ease of Business Must be Judged by Outcomes
India has made meaningful progress in digitising processes, reducing entry barriers and simplifying procedures. These gains deserve recognition. Yet entry is different from the ability to invest, expand, contract and exit.

Investors assess the reliability of clearances, consistency of regulatory interpretation, time taken to resolve disputes and predictability of enforcement. State-level differences matter. Federal competition is useful, but uneven administrative capacity makes expansion costly. Institutional reliability often matters more to long-term capital than a marginal tax change.

Ease of doing business rankings and surveys are useful indicators, but they cannot fully capture the lived experience of enterprise. With due humility, one must ask whether they adequately reflect what millions of smaller entrepreneurs encounter in dealing with local permissions, inspections, compliance demands, delayed payments and inconsistent regulatory interpretation.

Large corporations have the resources to navigate these frictions. A small entrepreneur often bears them as a direct cost of doing business. There is a danger when governments begin to believe their own announcements and survey rankings.

The distance between a reform declared and a reform experienced can then disappear from official assessment. The test of reform must also be what an entrepreneur experiences on the ground.

India also needs a coherent industrial policy that defines what the country intends to build over the next twenty years. Which manufacturing capabilities must be developed domestically? Which technologies, materials and component ecosystems must India master to become a consequential participant in global value chains?

Component assembly can create jobs and exports, but it cannot alone be equated with manufacturing depth. A country that imports critical components and technology while undertaking final assembly captures only a limited share of value and remains exposed to external supply chains.

India’s manufacturing ambition must extend to design, engineering, materials, components, technology and productivity. Tax incentives can encourage investment, but without a sustained industrial direction, they cannot determine what the country ultimately builds.

Corruption Survives Through Administrative Discretion
Digitisation has reduced some petty rent-seeking, and large centralised scandals have become less characteristic of the public conversation. Yet procedural corruption persists through inspections, certifications, local permissions, compliance disputes and selective interpretation of rules. It often takes the form of delay, harassment and uncertainty.

The cost of corruption has not disappeared. It has changed form, scale and vocabulary across different layers of the economy. Larger businesses may encounter it through intermediaries, opaque arrangements, hidden beneficial interests or payments dressed up through professional accounting and commercial relationships.

The smaller entrepreneur has no such buffers. A street-cart vendor or a chaat seller may have to negotiate daily with local functionaries simply to continue earning a livelihood. The amounts may be small, but the extraction is constant. For a large enterprise, it can become another cost to be managed. For a nano-entrepreneur, it can determine whether the business remains viable. We should be careful about declaring the system cleansed when the experience of those operating within it tells a more complicated story.

There is an equally uncomfortable question about the political economy of wealth and power. Public disclosures of assets by elected representatives, the visible expansion of political opulence and the extraordinary resources required to sustain political influence deserve greater public scrutiny.

Wealth accumulation by itself does not establish wrongdoing, but the gap between declared means, visible lifestyles and the cost of sustaining political machinery cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Money, manpower and muscle have long shaped the contest for political influence.

In parts of the political and administrative system, there also persists an assumption that a share of entrepreneurial effort is available for extraction. When access, permissions and the ability to operate become contingent on accommodating such expectations, the cost of doing business rises well beyond the tax rate. We may announce that corruption has been eliminated, but entrepreneurs continue to price its presence into their decisions.

The erosion of business confidence may therefore have some of its answers in the very realities that official assessments fail to capture.

Contract Enforcement Determines the Cost of Capital
Capital is committed for years, sometimes decades. Investors therefore price the risk that contracts will not be honoured, disputes will remain unresolved and commercial rights will be difficult to enforce. Delayed justice raises the effective cost of capital and can make complex projects unattractive.

Better commercial dispute resolution and local administration are investment reforms, especially for firms unable to carry prolonged litigation. Entrepreneurs experience state capacity through the official processing a licence, the regulator interpreting a rule and the court resolving a dispute. Implementation determines whether confidence survives.

Public Policy Must Answer for its Fiscal Choices
Public investment can draw private capital into productive activity. Reliable transport, power, logistics, education, health, skills and research reduce business costs and expand productive capacity. Well-chosen public capital expenditure can crowd in private investment. The state cannot outsource its developmental responsibilities.

Tax concessions also carry a fiscal opportunity cost. Revenue forgone could support infrastructure, human capital, research or fiscal consolidation. Incentives should be assessed against additional investment, jobs, productivity and alternative uses of public resources. The question is whether the concession changed behaviour and delivered public value, not whether recipients displayed gratitude.

Geopolitical Uncertainty Belongs in Boardroom Calculations
Trade restrictions, sanctions, export controls, energy insecurity, shipping disruptions and concentrated supply chains can alter a project’s viability. Companies must assess market access, jurisdictional exposure and political risk alongside costs and expected returns. Diversifying suppliers, production locations and export markets is prudent risk management.

For listed companies, this is part of protecting shareholder capital. Boards cannot ignore geopolitical exposure or domestic political and regulatory uncertainty. Governments should attract investment through competitive conditions and credible institutions, not turn it into a test of political loyalty.

The Prime Minister is right to challenge corporate India on ambition

India needs a compact of mutual accountability: government must create conditions in which enterprise can invest with confidence, and business must convert opportunity into productive capacity, innovation and good jobs. Political leadership can invite and incentivise investment. It must earn the confidence on which investment rests. Confidence grows through consistent rules and credible delivery.