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Wars, pandemics and financial crises have forced sweeping change. Why has climate catastrophe struggled to do the same—and what would it take to break the pattern?


Dr Arvind Mayaram is a former Finance Secretary to the Government of India, a senior policy advisor, and teaches public policy. He is also Chairman of the Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur.
October 2, 2026 at 3:24 AM IST
The latest United Nations assessments have forced a difficult recognition upon policymakers everywhere. The aspiration of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is increasingly beyond reach. The policy debate is shifting from preventing overshoot to managing it.
Yet this raises a more fundamental question.
Why has climate change failed to produce the kind of transformative response that other major crises have historically generated?
Financial crises have led to sweeping regulatory reforms. Wars have reshaped national priorities and international institutions. The COVID-19 pandemic triggered extraordinary fiscal, monetary and administrative interventions within weeks. Climate change, despite mounting evidence of economic disruption and human suffering, has produced a far more incremental response.
The usual explanations are familiar. Some point to inadequate scientific understanding. Others emphasise technological limitations or shortages of finance. Each contains an element of truth. Yet none appears sufficient to explain the persistence of the gap between climate ambition and climate outcomes.
Beyond Information, Technology and Finance
The world is not suffering from an information shortage. Climate change is among the most extensively studied public-policy challenges in history. Successive IPCC assessments have progressively narrowed scientific uncertainty, while climate risks are now embedded in the assessments of central banks, financial regulators and major corporations.
Nor does technology provide a complete explanation. Significant challenges remain in sectors such as steel, cement and aviation, but the costs of renewable energy, battery storage and several other low-carbon technologies have fallen dramatically over the past decade. The challenge today is less one of invention than of deployment at scale.
Finance presents a more complex picture. Developing countries face genuine financing constraints, particularly in adaptation and resilient infrastructure. Yet financing gaps should not be confused with a shortage of global capital. Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors collectively manage assets measured in the hundreds of trillions of dollars.
The more relevant question is why these resources are not reaching climate investments at the scale and speed required.
The persistence of climate inaction therefore points towards a deeper explanation.
Why Climate Change Is Different
Historically, societies mobilise most effectively when three conditions are present. Responsibility can be identified. Consequences are immediate and visible. Institutions possess the authority to act at the scale of the threat.
Wars, pandemics and financial crises broadly satisfy these conditions.
Climate change satisfies none of them fully.
Responsibility is diffuse, arising from the cumulative actions of billions of producers and consumers over long periods. Consequences are often delayed, unevenly distributed and difficult to attribute to any single decision. While individual climate-related disasters may be devastating, the connection between a specific event and a specific policy failure is rarely clear enough to generate sustained political accountability.
Climate risks are also global, whereas the institutions expected to manage them remain overwhelmingly national. The benefits of climate action are often collective and long-term, while many of the costs are immediate and local.
These characteristics make climate change fundamentally different from the crises that have historically generated rapid and decisive responses.
The Institutional Mismatch
This distinction matters because institutions shape incentives. Institutions influence economic and political outcomes by determining how societies organise collective action. Climate change exposes the limitations of institutional arrangements designed for a different category of challenge.
Most political and economic institutions evolved to address problems that were national in scope, relatively immediate in impact and confined to particular sectors. Climate change is global, long-term and systemic. It cuts across energy systems, infrastructure, agriculture, public finance and international relations simultaneously.
A mismatch between the nature of the problem and the design of the institutions expected to solve it is therefore inevitable.
This mismatch is particularly evident in developing countries.
For many governments, the challenge is not choosing between climate action and climate inaction. It is choosing among climate action, energy access, employment generation, fiscal stability, industrialisation and poverty reduction. Climate objectives must compete with other urgent developmental priorities rather than being pursued in isolation.
What is frequently interpreted as a lack of political will often reflects the realities of governing under multiple and competing constraints.
The result is not inaction in the strict sense. Governments continue to adopt climate policies, invest in renewable energy and participate in international agreements. But the pace of action remains slower than the pace at which climate risks are accumulating because institutions struggle to reconcile long-term collective interests with short-term political and economic incentives.
The debate on climate finance illustrates the broader institutional problem.
Much of the discussion focuses on mobilising additional resources. That is undoubtedly necessary. But the more fundamental issue concerns the architecture through which capital is allocated and recycled.
The world possesses substantial pools of savings. The challenge lies in moving capital towards investments that carry construction risk, technology risk, policy risk, and regulatory uncertainty. Climate finance is therefore not merely a question of volume. It is a question of institutional design.
The answer could lie with Circular Finance, which seeks to recycle scarce public and concessional capital as projects mature and risks decline, allowing resources to be redeployed into new investments. Rather than treating catalytic capital as a one-time resource, it treats it as a continuously renewable asset capable of supporting multiple investment cycles.
Its significance lies not only in expanding the effective resource envelope but also in demonstrating how institutional innovation can help bridge the gap between available capital and investible opportunities.
The lesson extends well beyond finance. Similar thinking is required in infrastructure planning, fiscal frameworks, multilateral development finance and international cooperation.
From Climate Ambition to Institutional Adaptation
The prevailing climate discourse remains dominated by targets, commitments and financing pledges. These are important. But they address symptoms more than causes.
The deeper challenge is institutional capability.
Collective action remains inadequate because the institutions through which societies organise decisions are poorly aligned with risks that are global, long-term and intergenerational. Climate change is therefore best understood not as a failure of science, technology or even finance. It is a failure of institutional adaptation.
Unless political, fiscal and financial institutions evolve to match the scale and time horizon of the climate challenge, climate catastrophes are likely to accumulate faster than effective responses to them. The central task before policymakers is not merely to raise ambition or mobilise more resources. It is to redesign the mechanisms through which collective action is organised.
Only then can climate policy move from managing consequences to shaping outcomes.