The Fragile Federation Next Door

Pakistan continues to survive against all odds, not because its federation is healthy, but because too many external powers continue to find strategic value in its survival. For much of its history, Pakistan has confounded analysts. Time and again, political crises, economic collapse, insurgencies and institutional dysfunction have prompted predictions of an impending break-up. Yet the state has endured. That resilience has often been taken for granted and mistaken for stability.

The latest unrest in PoJK, coming on the heels of renewed violence in Balochistan, a resurgence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the return of suicide bombings, once again raises an uncomfortable question. Should we take it as just one of those cycles of Pakistan’s survival? Or, is Pakistan witnessing symptoms of a federation whose internal cohesion is steadily eroding to a point of no return?

The answer lies somewhere between alarmism and complacency. Pakistan is apparently not on the verge of disintegration. But neither can its multiple fault lines be dismissed as routine turbulence. It remains a fragile federation whose survival increasingly depends as much on external geopolitical calculations as on internal political legitimacy.

A Federation Under Strain
Unlike most nation-states, Pakistan has struggled to reconcile a powerful centralised security establishment with a remarkably diverse social and ethnic landscape. The military has long been the principal binding institution, often compensating for weak civilian governance and uneven federalism. Yet cohesion imposed through central authority is not the same as cohesion built on political consent.

Across the country, distinct regions articulate different grievances. Baloch nationalism seeks greater control over natural resources and political autonomy. Pashtun areas continue to grapple with militancy, counter-terrorism operations and questions of representation. Sindhi identity politics periodically resurfaces in response to perceptions of demographic and political imbalance. Mohajir politics remains a reminder that even the community which once formed the backbone of Pakistan's urban elite continues to wrestle with issues of representation and power.

Now, PoK too appears increasingly restless. Economic protests have evolved into broader political demands over governance, accountability and Islamabad's control over local affairs. Though very different in origin and intensity from the Baloch insurgency or Pashtun militancy, these developments expose a common thread; growing dissatisfaction with the relationship between the federation and its constituent regions.

The reality is that no single movement today directly threatens Pakistan's territorial integrity. Collectively, however, they point to a deeper structural challenge. The question is no longer whether Pakistan faces internal fault lines. It is whether the federation possesses sufficient political flexibility to manage them simultaneously. That is a notion in serious doubt.

Why Pakistan Endures?
If internal pressures alone determined the fate of states, Pakistan's trajectory would have been far more uncertain. Instead, it has repeatedly survived because successive generations of external powers have concluded that preserving Pakistan serves their strategic interests better than confronting the consequences of its failure. That is a plausible explanation for the ‘for ever’ fissiparous state that Pakistan has become.  

During the Cold War, Pakistan became a frontline ally against Soviet influence. During the Afghan jihad and later the Global War on Terror, it regained strategic centrality despite persistent concerns over extremism.Even as economic crises deepened, international financial institutions repeatedly stepped in (28 times by IMF alone), encouraged by countries that viewed Pakistan as too important to abandon. This pattern continues today, albeit for different reasons.

Pakistan's geography remains strategically valuable. It sits astride the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, the Gulf and China's western frontier. It possesses one of the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenals. It borders Afghanistan at a time when that country continues to present complex security challenges. For many external actors, a weakened Pakistan is manageable; a collapsed Pakistan would be profoundly destabilising, chaotic in reality.

Pakistan has therefore become one of the few states whose failure is regarded as a greater strategic risk than the recurring cost of stabilising it. A truism of modern-day geopolitics.

The Geopolitical Insurance Policy
No country has invested more in Pakistan than China. For Beijing, Pakistan is a strategic asset—anchoring CPEC, providing access to the Arabian Sea, securing China's western flank and keeping India strategically preoccupied. Yet, while China can finance infrastructure and sustain the economy, it cannot manufacture national cohesion. Investment can strengthen a state, but it cannot create political legitimacy.

The US approaches Pakistan differently but reaches a similar conclusion. Its engagement has always been transactional, rising and falling with changing strategic priorities. Today, Washington's principal concerns are no longer alliance politics but nuclear security, terrorism, regional stability and preventing the emergence of security vacuums. None of these objectives favours a collapsing Pakistan.

The Gulf states have also evolved in their approach. Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly pursue economic diversification and pragmatic diplomacy. Nevertheless, Pakistan remains an important military partner, a source of trained manpower and an influential Islamic state. Financial assistance may no longer be unconditional, but neither are these relationships easily dispensable.

Taken together, these actors constitute an informal geopolitical insurance policy. They may differ on many issues, but all share one broad objective: preventing instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan from becoming unmanageable.

The Return of Internal Conflict
External support cannot eliminate internal contradictions. Recent months have witnessed a worrying convergence of security challenges. The TTP has intensified attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgents continue to target state institutions and Chinese interests. ISIS-K retains the ability to mount spectacular attacks. Most troublingly, Pakistan has once again witnessed the return of suicide bombings, a grim reminder of a period many believed had passed.

Very few countries today confront separatist insurgencies, jihadist terrorism, sectarian violence and political unrest simultaneously. Pakistan does. For years, Islamabad's instinct has been to interpret many internal disturbances through the prism of external conspiracy, with India frequently portrayed as the principal instigator; the latest video of DG ISPR refers. Such narratives may serve immediate political purposes, but they cannot substitute for addressing governance deficits, economic distress or regional alienation.

Just remember the durability of a federation ultimately rests less on coercion than on consent. Again, a truism.

India's Strategic Perspective
We in India would do well to resist both complacency and triumphalism. A weaker Pakistan does not automatically make India more secure. On the contrary, prolonged instability on our western frontier creates new uncertainties—nuclear security, proxy terrorism, refugee flows, military adventurism to divert domestic attention, and deeper Chinese involvement.

Our task is not to speculate on Pakistan's disintegration but to prepare for a neighbour that may continue to weaken internally while remaining strategically indispensable externally. That paradox is one India can no longer afford to overlook.

Pakistan's defining challenge is not merely another economic crisis, insurgency or political confrontation. It is whether it can transform itself from a federation held together by the Army, strategic geography and external patrons into a nation sustained by the confidence and consent of its own people.

That is Pakistan's unresolved contradiction. It is also the world's unresolved strategic dilemma. External powers can keep Pakistan ‘afloat’; only Pakistan can keep itself ‘together’.