Nine years after demonetisation, India counts more workers than ever. What it has neither counted nor protected is what their work pays. Through three shocks, policy insured capital and consumption but left the earnings of three-quarters of the workforce to absorb the damage.


Dr Arvind Mayaram is a former Finance Secretary to the Government of India, a senior policy advisor, and teaches public policy. He is also Chairman of the Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur.
November 16, 2026 at 5:53 AM IST
On the measures the government chooses to report, India's labour market has rarely looked stronger. Employment reached 579 million in July–September 2026. Unincorporated enterprises employed 131.3 million people in early 2025. Judged by headcount, the three shocks of the past decade (demonetisation in 2016, GST in 2017 and the pandemic in 2020) have been absorbed.
More jobs, the same pay
Judged by what work pays, the picture is very different. The Periodic Labour Force Survey, or PLFS, shows average monthly earnings of salaried employees rising from ₹19,316 in 2022 to ₹22,699 in 2025, and of the self-employed from ₹12,732 to ₹14,861. After inflation, that is about 1% a year. Casual labourers gained barely half that. Own-account workers, the largest single group, saw real daily earnings fall by about 8% between 2017-18 and 2023-24, and self-employed women lost almost a third of their real income.
In all, about 350 million of India's roughly 460 million, some 76%, work in categories where real incomes have barely moved since before the pandemic. Relative to the economy, the majority have grown poorer. For own-account workers and most working women, the loss is absolute.
What low unemployment conceals
Unemployment has fallen from 6.0% in 2017-18 to 3.1% in 2025. Alongside flat earnings, this is not the mark of a tightening labour market, which would push wages up. It reflects how few people can afford to be without work. Unemployment in 2025 was 0.3% among those who never went to school, but 11.2% among graduates. Azim Premji University's State of Working India 2026 counts 11 million graduates aged 20 to 29 unemployed in 2023. Open unemployment is confined to those who can afford to wait, and the educated young are waiting in their millions.
Part of the recorded rise in employment also rests on thin criteria. PLFS counts as employed anyone who worked one hour in the survey week, or 30 days in the year, including unpaid family helpers, who make up 15.6% of all workers. These conventions have not changed since 2017-18. What has changed is how many households must send another member into marginal work to stand still.
Beyond the three shocks
The usual explanation blames the shocks, but that is only half the story. The shocks did break the informal economy's momentum. Between 2010-11 and 2015-16, about 5.7 million unincorporated enterprises were added, but only 2 million in the seven years that followed. Employment in the sector fell from 111.3 million in 2015-16 to 97.9 million in 2021-22, then exceeded 120 million by 2023-24, while real earnings stayed flat. Had the shocks alone been responsible, earnings would have recovered with jobs. What failed was the policy response.
The state responded with three kinds of instruments. The first was support for capital, through the 2019 corporate tax cut costing ₹1.45 trillion a year, production-linked incentives, and credit guarantees that reached firms with balance sheets. The second was a floor under consumption, through free foodgrains and cash transfers. The third was counting success by headcount. None was aimed at what informal workers could earn. The state insured survival and investment, but not livelihoods.
The newest instrument repeats the pattern. The Pradhan Mantri Viksit Bharat Rozgar Yojana, with an outlay of ₹994.46 billion, targets 35 million jobs registered with the EPFO, with no test of whether they pay a living wage. Even salaried work is precarious. In 2025, 58.2% of salaried employees outside agriculture had no written contract and 51.7% had no social security cover.
The informal economy was left to absorb people. Displaced wage workers became own-account traders, and family members joined household enterprises. Self-employment rose from 52.2% to 58.4% of the workforce. The same demand was divided among more hands, so headcount rose while earnings per worker stalled.
Margins over payrolls
The corporate sector tells the opposite story. Profits of listed companies rose 22.3% in 2023-24 while their employment grew 1.5%. The profit-to-GDP ratio of Nifty 500 companies reached 4.8%, the highest since 2007-08. Pay for CEOs and directors of BSE 200 companies rose 8.7% in 2024-25, outpacing revenue and profit growth. At Infosys, the CEO earned 752 times the median employee. At Mahindra & Mahindra, the CEO's pay nearly doubled to ₹473 million and managerial remuneration rose 84%, against about 10% for employees. The policy mix rewarded a recovery led by margins rather than payrolls.
Making earnings the measure
The real gains of 2025 came from inflation of 2.2%, not from rising pay. Retail inflation reached 5.54% in September 2026, and 6.08% in rural areas. With nominal earnings growing at about 6%, real gains for most earners will be close to zero this year, and negative in rural India.
A policy aimed at earnings would require four changes. First, PLFS quarterly bulletins should report pay, the one major indicator they leave out. Second, the national floor wage under the Code on Wages, in force since November 2025, should be notified and indexed to prices. Third, employment-linked and production-linked incentives should be tiered by wage band, rewarding most the jobs that pay above a regional living wage. Fourth, own-account enterprises, where most workers now are, need working capital, access to public procurement and links to wider markets.
The headline numbers will not keep the problem out of sight for long. The youth protests of July 2026, which began over examination leaks and led to the Education Minister's resignation, drew on frustrations the employment count misses. India has put people to work in large numbers, but not in work that pays, nor in work its educated young can accept. Until policy is judged by earnings rather than headcount, growth will register in employment counts and corporate balance sheets, while three-quarters of those who earn a living outside the corporate payroll stand still at best, and many grow poorer.