The War Above Us: Why Space Can No Longer Remain a Specialist Subject

Reading Lt Gen PJS Pannu's recently published book ‘Taramandal Sangram: Space Constellations at War’, left me with an uncomfortable thought. Most reasonably informed Indians understand something about land warfare, air power, missiles, drones and nuclear deterrence. Cyber warfare too has entered public consciousness. Yet ask what actually happens in space during a conflict and our understanding becomes remarkably thin.

That ignorance is becoming untenable. Modern warfare increasingly depends upon assets orbiting hundreds or thousands of kilometres above us. They enable communications, navigation, surveillance, targeting, missile warning and command and control. Space may appear distant from the battlefield, but increasingly it determines what happens on it.

War is too consequential to remain the preserve of soldiers, just as space is too consequential to remain the preserve of scientists.

The Battlefield Has Already Moved Upwards

The popular imagination associates military space with rockets and satellites, perhaps with anti-satellite missiles destroying objects in orbit. The reality is much wider.

A modern military needs to know where the adversary is, communicate securely across enormous distances, navigate accurately, identify targets, guide weapons and continuously update its operational picture. Much of this is now enabled by space.

 This is why General Pannu describes space as the "ultimate high ground." It does not replace land, sea or air warfare. It increasingly enables all three.

The implications are profound. A military denied access to space may retain its aircraft, ships, missiles and formations, but elements of its ability to see, communicate, navigate and strike precisely can be seriously degraded. Conversely, the side possessing a better space-enabled picture can reduce uncertainty and accelerate decisions.

The advantage therefore increasingly lies not merely in firepower, but in decision superiority enabled by inputs from space.

Kargil, Uri and the Eye in the Sky

Kargil offers an important counterfactual. In 1999, our ability to maintain persistent surveillance across vast, high-altitude and largely unoccupied terrain was severely constrained. Had today's quality of satellite surveillance, imagery and data fusion been available, the progressive intrusion and concentration across the heights would have been far more difficult to conceal. The crisis may never have acquired the dimensions it eventually did.

Space does not eliminate surprise, but it can dramatically reduce the physical gaps in which surprise can be created.

There was another lesson from Kargil. India was denied access to the quality of GPS data it sought during the conflict. General Pannu recalls this experience as one of the reasons that reinforced the importance of an indigenous navigation system. Strategic autonomy in space is therefore not an abstraction; it is about ensuring that critical capabilities remain available when they are needed most.

Both General Pannu and I commanded the Uri Brigade. In fact, he was one of my Brigade Commanders when I commanded Baramulla Division in 2008. Uri presents a classic commander's dilemma. Threats can emerge from multiple directions, mountains and valleys restrict observation, and deception can make every trigger appear important.

The commander's question is therefore not simply, "What is happening?" but "What is really happening, and where is the adversary trying to make me look?"

Drones today provide an excellent tactical and sub-tactical picture. But a drone gives you only a time window; a satellite gives you the canvas. It helps reveal wider patterns of movement, infrastructure and concentration that enable the commanders to plan and respond.

What Would a Space War Actually Look Like?

Space warfare need not begin with satellites being physically destroyed. A spectrum of actions spring through the five Ds: denial, disruption, degradation, deception and destruction.

A satellite signal can be jammed. Navigation can be spoofed, giving false positioning information. Communications can be disrupted. Ground stations and networks can be subjected to cyberattack. Sensors can be interfered with. Only at the extreme end does physical destruction become necessary.

The opening moves of a future conflict could therefore remain largely invisible to the public even while their consequences become increasingly visible on Earth.

This also changes how we measure military advantage. The contest becomes one of decision cycles, network effectiveness and resilience. Information must be collected, processed, fused, disseminated and converted into action. The side that completes this cycle faster gains an enormous advantage.

Technology should not replace commanders. It should enable them to understand their battlespace earlier and exercise command with greater confidence.

There is, however, an inherent vulnerability. As militaries become more dependent upon space, disruption of space services becomes increasingly attractive to an adversary. Resilience therefore becomes part of deterrence; distributed constellations, redundancy, protected communications, alternative systems and the ability to restore lost capability quickly.

The Same Eye Watches Over Peace

The military is not alone in depending upon this eye in the sky.

The Chamoli disaster of February 2021 initially presented a mystery; where had the enormous volume of water and debris come from? Ground investigation struggled to establish the sequence. Satellite imagery eventually revealed the massive scar high in inaccessible terrain and helped reconstruct the event. The satellite became a forensic investigator when the human eye could not reach the scene.

South Lhonak in Sikkim subsequently demonstrated the importance of monitoring evolving hazards. Dharali also reminded us that space technology is powerful, but not omniscient. The lesson is common to warfare and disaster management; no single sensor gives us the whole truth. Satellite imagery, radar, drones, ground sensors and increasingly AI must produce a fused picture.

India's Next Strategic Frontier

The larger argument is about national power. India has travelled from a space programme primarily associated with development to one increasingly central to technology, economic activity and national security.

The next requirement is a resilient national space architecture, integrating military requirements, ISRO's expertise, indigenous navigation, private industry, cyber capability, AI and trained human resources.

Equally important is space literacy among military officers, policymakers, industry, universities and the public. Future wars will still see soldiers holding ground, aircraft contesting airspace and ships dominating sea lanes. But their ability to see, communicate, navigate and strike will increasingly depend upon space.

Gen Pannu’s book Taramandal Sangram makes this unfamiliar domain accessible and reminds us that space warfare is neither science fiction nor a distant possibility.

The next major war may still be fought primarily on Earth, but its outcome could increasingly be shaped in space.