India’s Multi-Alignment Policy Faces Its Toughest Test Yet

The Iran conflict is forcing India to stress-test its multi-alignment strategy, balancing ties, asserting neutrality, and proving its geopolitical relevance.

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By Karan Mehrishi

Karan Mehrishi is an author and economics commentator, specialising in monetary economics. He is also the host of the Talking Central Banks podcast.

March 27, 2026 at 6:01 AM IST

The Iran conflict is perhaps the biggest test yet for India’s multi-aligned foreign policy. And the space for passive balancing is narrowing fast.

Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel and addressed the Knesset, receiving a warm welcome from Benjamin Netanyahu. India–Israel ties have long been strong, but the timing of their elevation to a ‘special strategic partnership’ stood out. Within days of his return, Israel, alongside US forces, launched attacks on Iran.

For India, Iran is no less important. Beyond civilisational links, Tehran serves as a strategic hedge in the Middle East. The Chabahar Port, built with Indian investment, is key to accessing Central Asia via Afghanistan. It also offers a counterweight to Gwadar in Pakistan, backed by China for similar strategic ends.

Iran’s attack on the UAE adds another layer to an already complicated equation. The UAE is one of India’s closest partners in the region. With Saudi Arabia signing a mutual protection pact with Pakistan, India had been exploring a similar arrangement with Abu Dhabi, something underscored by Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s recent visit to New Delhi.

Now, with Dubai under threat, the margin for ambiguity is shrinking. India will have to think through its next steps far more carefully. Adding to this is India’s complex relationship with both the US and Russia, powers supporting opposing sides in this conflict but viewing India as a strategic hedge against China.

As the original founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, and now moving towards multi-alignment with a ‘NAM 2.0’ approach, India has been trying to ride a very delicate wave, choosing no sides as an unstated but consistent rule of its foreign policy. As the geopolitics surrounding the Iran conflict intensifies, however, multiple allies may force India to choose a side, at least symbolically.

In earlier Middle East conflicts, including 1973, 1990, and 2008, India was not consequential enough to be pressured decisively. That has changed. Today, India matters, and that makes neutrality harder to sustain

Policy Direction

Planning ahead is now essential. Indian policymakers need to think through possible scenarios quickly, while sharpening the tools that allow India to remain a genuinely multi-aligned player. There is some precedent here. Switzerland, during the Second World War, faced a similar predicament and offers a useful reference point.

It stayed out of a war unfolding right around it, not by accident but by design. India will need a similarly deliberate strategy to safeguard its sovereignty. At its core, that means doubling down on three pillars: clear neutrality, deeper diplomatic engagement, and credible military deterrence. These cannot be situational choices. They have to be consistent, forming the foundation of India’s foreign policy regardless of how the conflict evolves.

Discussing this in detail, first and foremost, India must formally communicate to the world that it is a neutral actor and will choose no sides, irrespective of its close relations with all belligerents in question. Yet, it is not isolationist and will continue to align with partners across trade, economics, and technology where mutually beneficial.

As with its ‘no first use’ nuclear doctrine, India needs to be clear about its position. It should state that it will not enter an armed conflict unless its territory is attacked or its core interests are directly threatened. Right now, that clarity is missing, and the silence could end up hurting India’s interests as the situation in the Middle East evolves.

If India does not communicate where it stands, partners may begin to question its reliability as a regional power. There is also a broader risk, that India is simply not taken seriously enough, despite its growing economic and military weight. That, in turn, leaves room for China to deepen its influence in the region, often through infrastructure financing and defence ties.

Strategic Leverage

Second, India must step forward as a diplomatic mediator. Offering New Delhi as neutral ground for negotiations is one step. Actively dispatching envoys to facilitate dialogue is another.

This extends to offering political asylum where necessary. India has precedent here, from hosting the Dalai Lama after China’s occupation of Tibet to more recent examples such as Sheikh Hasina amid political instability in Bangladesh.

Soft power must complement diplomacy. India can position itself as a first responder in humanitarian crises, offering medical aid regardless of alignment. Its assistance to Turkey after the 2023 earthquake showed this is not theoretical. Doing something similar now would reinforce its image as a credible, neutral partner.

That, in turn, builds real diplomatic leverage.

In many ways, India is better placed than most. Iran is unlikely to accept mediation from US allies, and Israel would be wary of anything seen as overtly pro-Iranian. India, though, still has working ties with both, which gives it a narrow but real opening to act as a neutral platform.

That said, diplomacy on its own will not be enough. India will have to keep building out its military-industrial base and reduce dependence on external defence supply chains. Strategic autonomy, in the end, comes down to capability.

The Indian Ocean Region and its shipping lanes will be a key part of this. Military posture needs to be aligned with current realities, strong enough to deter, but calibrated enough to avoid escalation.

Most of these recommendations are already in line with India’s tried and tested non-alignment posturing. In the past, it lacked the resources to implement these principals as part of the global rhetoric. India now has the economic and military weight to back its position in a way it could not before.

The Iran conflict, then, is not just another test. It is a chance to show that India’s foreign policy is not just well-articulated, but workable in practice.

What India does next will shape how seriously it is taken as a regional power. Because right now, saying nothing is not caution. It is risk.