Charting a New Course: Why India’s Shipbuilding Ambitions Need a Strategic Redirection

Let’s talk shipbuilding. In 2025, a curious synchronicity unfolded in global maritime policy. Both the United States and India, maritime nations with vast coastlines but marginal commercial shipbuilding sectors, launched multi-billion dollar schemes to “reclaim” their standing on the world’s industrial stage. India’s announcement was particularly bold: a ₹447 billion ($5.4 billion) Shipbuilding Financial Assistance and Development Scheme, running through 2036 with an eye on (surprise, surprise) 2047—the year it aims to achieve “major maritime power” status. The plan offers up to 25% subsidies per vessel and credit guarantees, directly mirroring the state-backed financing that propelled China and South Korea to dominance. On paper, it is India’s long-awaited “Maruti moment” for its maritime sector.

Yet, ambitions have to be tempered by reality. The global shipbuilding market, valued at $160-170 billion and growing modestly, is a fortress guarded by three Asian giants , China, South Korea, and Japan in that order, who collectively command over 90% of its value. For India, currently contributing a meagre 0.06% of global output, crashing this party will require more than just financial heft; it demands a fundamental strategic rethink. This analysis will argue that while India’s new policy is a necessary acknowledgment of a critical deficiency, it risks being a costly repetition of past errors. By examining the sector’s entrenched structural failures and the lessons from global leaders, I will chart an alternative course—one prioritising forced consolidation, dominance in high-value maritime services, and strategic collaboration over mere subsidy-driven expansion.

A) The Global Arena and India’s Persistent Lag

India challenge is in ascending a ladder defined by a rigid global hierarchy. At its peak sits China, the undisputed volume and aggregate value leader with a ~50-55% market share, churning out everything from standard bulk carriers to advanced container ships through sheer scale and state orchestration. Just below, South Korea has carved out supremacy in the most lucrative, technologically complex segments—such as LNG carriers and mega-container ships—where a single vessel can be worth three to five times a comparable Chinese-built ship. Japan, third in the list, has strategically retreated from the highest-cost technology wars to dominate the crucial high-volume segments of bulk and tanker trade, where its peerless reputation for operational reliability and efficiency commands a premium.

The Global Shipbuilding Landscape: A Snapshot of Dominance

(Source: Clarksons Research, BRS Group, UNCTAD)

Against this backdrop, India’s presence and position are not just marginal; they have been virtually stagnant. The Indian shipbuilding sector exemplifies the pitfalls of a floundering industrial policy, caught between geopolitics, market forces, and internal contradictions. The nation spends a staggering $70-75 billion annually on foreign shipping services while over 90% of its own fleet is built abroad—a glaring strategic and economic vulnerability.

B) Beyond Cosmetic Cures

India’s new $5.4 billion package, while substantial, appears to diagnose the sector’s deep-seated problems only superficially, risking a repetition of past failures on a more expensive scale.

The industry’s woes are systemic:

1.      Chronic Fragmentation and Cyclical Busts: The landscape is currently dotted with small, under-capitalised yards that bloom during fleeting booms only to demand bailouts during busts. This prevents the economies of scale and sustained R&D that define the success of Korean chaebols and Chinese state giants.

2.      A Crippling Cost Structure: Indian yards suffer a 20-40% cost disadvantage, stemming from expensive domestic steel, high capital costs, and inadequate infrastructure. A 20% subsidy cannot bridge the gap to reach global export competitiveness.

3.      The Low-Value Trap: A historical reliance on protected, low-value coastal vessels and sporadic naval orders - a trap solidified by failed cabotage rules - has stymied the climb into complex, high-margin shipbuilding. Cabotage created a captive market that shielded inefficiency and raised national logistics costs without fostering global skills.

The new policy’s core mechanisms inadvertently perpetuate these problems. The “Right of First Refusal” for government orders and a 30-year demand plan primarily tether the industry’s survival to domestic state procurement (i.e., the Navy and the Coast Guard). This creates a protected, uncompetitive sector dependent on government life-support, not one programmed to compete to win in the global arena. Crucially, the plan ignores the consolidation imperative, continuing to sprinkle support across a fragmented landscape incapable of competing with the integrated behemoths of Ulsan or Shanghai.

This is not the first time strategic sense has been glimpsed but lost. In 2013, a serendipitous alignment of the finance ministry officer in charge of infrastructure policy with two exemplary diplomats, the Indian Ambassador in Seoul and the South Korean Ambassador in Delhi, sought to leverage South Korean expertise to jumpstart the moribund sector through investment and partnerships. This promising initiative was shelved with the change in administration in 2014, and the sector continued its languid decline—a cautionary tale of how strategic foresight can fall victim to political transition.

C) A Strategic Redirection

For India’s gambit to succeed, it needs to move beyond blanket subsidies to a targeted industrial strategy. Success lies not in replicating China’s yesterday but in charting a unique, sustainable path to establishing itself on the world stage. Given the competition, the state of the country’s shipbuilding sector and the need for scale, I would suggest the following four steps:

1.      Mandatory consolidation and a creation of a public sector vanguard
The alternative to avoidable private monopolisation or continued fragmentation is a state-orchestrated creation of 2-3 “National Shipbuilding Champions.” By mandating and facilitating the merger of major public and select private yards, India can create entities with the scale, capital, and mandate for export. A restructured, empowered public-sector anchor (like a revitalised Cochin Shipyard Ltd.) can ensure long-term strategic goals override short-term profit motives, preventing monopolistic capture and ensuring the sector serves the national interests.

2.      The “MRO+” strategy of winning the service lane first
As “conquering” shipbuilding will not be easy, India can seek to dominate the service alley, using its greatest untapped advantage, its geography, which places it astride the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Instead of a vague push for low-end repairs, India should adopt a focused “MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) Plus” strategy, modelled on the high-value aviation MRO sector. The goal must be to become the global hub for mid-to-high complexity retrofits (scrubbers, ballast water systems, LNG conversions). This market is less cyclical, it is high-margin, and it is also skill-intensive. It will build a steady revenue stream, embed Indian facilities in global logistics networks, and create the technical proficiency essential for future complex new builds.

3.      Strategic Collaboration
A direct subsidy war with Asia will be futile, especially given the monetary heft of the competition and India’s fiscal limitations. Instead, India can position itself as the indispensable “third way” partner. As the US looks to South Korea for technology, India can offer South Korea what America cannot: massive, cost-competitive, skilled fabrication capacity. A strategic partnership, where Korean giants like M/s Hyundai transfer digital shipyard technology and management practices to Indian national champions, would be transformative. For South Korea, it diversifies from China and aligns with “friend-shoring”; for the West, it builds a democratic counterweight; for India, it is the fastest path to technological leapfrogging. Collaboration can begin on third-country commercial exports and non-sensitive naval auxiliaries, to assuage potential geopolitical concerns.

D) Retooling the policy toolkit
The new subsidy package needs to be recalibrated as a focussed, targeted tool, not a blanket policy. What could be tried is:

• Shifting subsidies from the “Build Anything” approach to “Building Capability”, by tying fiscal support to outcomes like export orders for complex vessels, adoption of digital twin technology, and achieving benchmarked productivity.
• Creation of a Maritime Technology Fund: dedicated funds for co-developing key technologies (e.g., LNG containment systems), accessible only to the consolidated national champions.
• Linking infrastructure spending to consolidation: The USD2.4 billion for infrastructure needs to be made be contingent on creating two or three world-class, greenfield mega-yards.
• Replacing cabotage with “Build in India” rebates: Scrap the restrictive cabotage rules. Instead, offer performance-linked rebates to Indian-flagged ships built, or substantially overhauled, domestically, incentivising activity without distorting the coastal logistics market.

To sum up, India’s $5.4 billion shipbuilding gambit is a necessary, belated admission of a critical strategic gap but as a policy, it remains an incomplete blueprint, treating the symptoms with subsidies while ignoring the structural disease of fragmentation, misaligned incentives, and technological lag. It risks creating permanent wards of the state, dependent on naval orders, rather than a dynamic, globally competitive industry.

The aim of true success should be not to merely enter the list of top 10 shipbuilding nations by 2030, but to get there sustainably. The path there lies in a fundamental rewiring of the scheme: consolidating to achieve scale, moving first to dominate the high-value repair and conversion niche to build skills and credibility, and leveraging astute geopolitical collaboration for technology transfer. The world’s shipbuilding order is being rewritten in an age of geopolitical rivalry and friend-shoring. India has a unique chance to write its own chapter — one of a nimble, technologically adept maritime industry integrated into global supply chains as a strategic partner. It would be shortsighted to settle for merely copying a chapter from a playbook that others wrote decades ago at a time when the window of opportunity is steadily shrinking with time.