SEBI’s Quiet Rule Change May Redefine Retail Market Participation

SEBI’s new BSDA framework uses defaults to reduce retail costs while structurally pressuring depository and broker revenue models.

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By Krishnadevan V

Krishnadevan is Consulting Editor at BasisPoint Insight. He has worked in the equity markets, and been a journalist at ET, AFX News, Reuters TV and Cogencis.

December 29, 2025 at 8:18 AM IST

SEBI’s latest circular on Basic Services Demat Accounts is a classic piece of regulatory housekeeping aimed at fixing the "dead weight" problem in retail portfolios. BSDA allows small investors to hold securities without the high annual maintenance fees of a full-service demat account. Eligibility, however, is capped by the total value of holdings, and the valuation rules have now been tweaked.

The new framework excludes delisted securities and Zero Coupon Zero Principal bonds from the eligibility thresholds and requires depository participants to reassess BSDA eligibility quarterly. It also tightens the consent loop, requiring investors to explicitly opt in to remain on a regular demat account.

At its core, the Securities and Exchange Board of India has flipped the default. Instead of assuming investors want a full-service demat account unless proven otherwise, the regulator now assumes the opposite. If holdings qualify, the account defaults to BDSA. To remain on a regular account, investors must clearly and verifiably state their preference.

The exclusions are significant. Delisted securities and ZCZP bonds no longer inflate portfolio values for BSDA eligibility, while illiquid holdings are marked at the last available closing price. In effect, SEBI is stripping out paper wealth that does not translate into usable market participation. What remains is a closer reflection of active investing capacity.

Eligibility is no longer a one-time classification but subject to quarterly reassessment. This introduces a gentle but persistent nudge. Investors drift into lower-cost structures unless they consciously resist. This matters because most retail investors tend to stick with default options and rarely respond to attention-demanding emails. SEBI appears to have accepted this behavioural reality and chosen to work with it rather than against it.

Small investors are the clear beneficiaries. They are likely to see lower fixed costs and fewer accidental fee leakages. The regulatory promise of “ease of investing” finally moves from brochure language to account mechanics.

A Hit to CDSL, NSDL
There is, however, a quieter loser. India’s two primary depositories, National Securities Depository Ltd and Central Depository Services Ltd, stand to face pressure.

Annual maintenance charges, transaction fees, and bundled services form a steady revenue stream for depository participants. The greater impact comes from the perpetual eligibility checks, which require depository participants to reassess and automatically downgrade qualifying accounts. A system that nudges marginal investors into BSDA structurally compresses this revenue stream. The quarterly consent requirement ensures that leakage persists, putting pressure on margins for both depositories and depository participants, typically stockbrokers.

SEBI’s move has, for now, made demat accounts more utility-like, and utility providers rarely command premium valuations. CDSL is currently trading at a price-to-earnings multiple of over 65 times, while NSDL is valued at nearly 63 times.

The broader market impact is more nuanced. Lower entry costs may widen participation, but they also alter its quality. Investors who remain on regular accounts will increasingly be self-selecting, while others will sit in a low-cost holding pattern.

This shift will affect everything from product design to liquidity assumptions. Passive participation behaves differently from engaged participation, and SEBI appears comfortable allowing that distinction to sharpen.

The broader signal is that Indian market regulation is shifting from disclosure overload to choice architecture. Instead of telling investors what to read, the regulator is deciding what happens if they do nothing.

When defaults shape outcomes, regulators can no longer pretend neutrality. They own the architecture. SEBI, to its credit, appears willing to accept that responsibility.

The circular does not shout reform, but it clearly signals intent. And in markets, it is often the quiet rules that have the most profound impact.