By Krishnadevan V
Krishnadevan is Consulting Editor at BasisPoint Insight. He has worked in the equity markets, and been a journalist at ET, AFX News, Reuters TV and Cogencis.
July 17, 2025 at 3:58 AM IST
The Jane Street Group manipulation episode has exposed fundamental flaws in India's market structure that go well beyond one trading firm. When SEBI accused the US firm of making ₹48.44 billion in "unlawful gains" by gaming Bank Nifty, the regulator’s response was predictably punitive: ban the perpetrators, freeze their assets, and declare victory.
But this theatrical response misses the deeper problem.
India's benchmark indices suffer from transparency gaps and information asymmetries that sophisticated players can exploit, compounded by the concentration of pricing power in a single exchange.
SEBI’s order reveals something more troubling than Jane Street's alleged tactics. The firm’s strategy worked because it knew it would reverse its morning purchases by day’s end, creating artificial price signals that misled options traders. This is market abuse that leverages timing to distort prices at others’ expense.
Unlike classic manipulation focused on volume or false information, temporal strategies exploit precise timing. This is a clear information asymmetry problem that calls for transparency reforms and changes to address exchange concentration.
Jane Street’s approach involved coordinated trades across cash, futures, and options markets. It bought stocks aggressively in the morning while building massive short positions in index options, then reversed its stock trades to profit from the decline. Other traders had no visibility into these planned reversals.
The real vulnerability lies in inadequate transparency around large derivative positions. Jane Street accumulated short positions worth ₹321.15 billion in Bank Nifty options while buying ₹43.70 billion of stocks, a 7x leverage that others could not see in real time. This opacity let the firm mislead traders about true index pressure.
Enhanced disclosure rules with real-time reporting of large delta exposures across segments would address this asymmetry. If market participants could see the massive short build-up alongside stock purchases, the strategy would become transparent and self-defeating.
Beyond transparency gaps, the SEBI order highlights venue monopolisation risks. NSE's control over Bank Nifty pricing meant Jane Street only needed to target one exchange to move the entire index. Exchange-agnostic indices that aggregate prices from NSE, BSE, and other venues would make such manipulation much harder and costlier.
This risk is acute on expiry days when Jane Street used "marking the close" strategies with massive trades in the final hour to influence settlement prices. Multi-venue pricing would force manipulators to coordinate across different liquidity profiles and participant bases, raising complexity and capital requirements.
India’s market surveillance systems are fragmented by segment, failing to spot cross-market coordination. Jane Street exploited this by syncing trades across cash, futures, and options markets in ways individual monitors missed. Real-time cross-segment monitoring would flag such patterns automatically, triggering alerts when an entity aggressively buys stocks while building opposite index option positions.
Exchange-agnostic indices would also strengthen surveillance frameworks, enabling cross-venue systems to track large positions and trading patterns for a more comprehensive and harder-to-evade network.
Settlement Vulnerabilities
Jane Street’s expiry-day strategy also exploited India’s settlement mechanisms, which rely heavily on the final trading hour. Volume-weighted settlement prices calculated over longer periods would reduce this vulnerability.
Multi-venue indices would further strengthen settlement integrity, making it impossible to manipulate closing prices through concentrated activity on a single exchange. Cross-venue margin requirements would raise the cost of coordinated manipulation while enhancing regulatory oversight.
Based on SEBI’s findings, India urgently needs transparency-focused reforms and structural changes to promote venue competition. Immediate priorities should include real-time disclosure of large delta exposures, cross-segment monitoring systems, improved settlement mechanisms that resist last-minute manipulation, and a phased shift to exchange-agnostic benchmarks.
Regulators should also require algorithmic trading firms to disclose strategy frameworks and risk management systems, with position disclosure requirements covering derivative exposures and cross-segment coordination.
The Jane Street case is not just about one firm’s alleged misconduct. It exposes systemic risks from information asymmetries and venue concentration. When sophisticated tactics exploit these weaknesses to mislead retail traders, the fundamental fairness of India’s markets is at stake.
As derivatives markets grow rapidly, the window for reform is narrowing. A phased approach starting with transparency and surveillance upgrades, pilot programmes for multi-venue indices in less critical benchmarks, and eventual migration of major indices like Bank Nifty and Nifty50 to exchange-agnostic frameworks is the way forward.
Jane Street’s advantage lay in hidden intentions and venue concentration. The solution is to make those intentions visible to all participants and distribute pricing power across multiple venues.