Jane Street’s Trades Reveal Global Options Sellers Rigged Indian Indices
SEBI’s probe exposes how India built the world's largest options market on a foundation of systematic retail exploitation
Dev Chandrasekhar
Dev Chandrasekhar advises corporates on big picture narratives relating to strategy, markets, and policy.
Sunil Goel
Sunil is an entrepreneur. He also advises businesses on supply chains, sales, and partnerships for growth
June 16, 2025 at 5:47 AM IST
When a single trading firm generates five times more profit than its nearest competitor, regulators should ask uncomfortable questions. India's Securities and Exchange Board finally started asking them about Jane Street to ascertain if they crossed the line from legal arbitrage into potential index manipulation.
SEBI's investigation into the US trading giant hopefully represents more than enforcement action against one firm. Jane Street's extraordinary profits expose fundamental structural flaws in India's options market that exchanges and regulators ignored for years while celebrating explosive volume growth.
The numbers reveal the problem's scope. Jane Street booked $2.34 billion from India in 2024, equivalent to11% of its global revenue, from a market where 93% of retail investors lose money. This wasn't superior trading skill; it was systematic exploitation of predictable market mechanics that regulatory authorities seemed content to overlook.
Jane Street's approach combined three technological advantages: quantitative models that identify opportunities, algorithmic execution that automates trading, and high-frequency capabilities that process thousands of transactions per second. But the firm's real edge came from India's structural vulnerabilities.
Weekly index option expiries created multiple manipulation opportunities each week. Since the Nifty-50 and Sensex are market-cap weighted, strategic trading in heavyweight stocks could move entire indices. Jane Street allegedly perfected this "bait and switch" strategy. It entails accumulating massive derivatives positions in index constituents, then trading those stocks in the physical market around expiry times to push prices favourably.
The exchange rivalry made systematic exploitation inevitable. BSE and the National Stock Exchange competed so aggressively for derivatives volumes that oversight became secondary. Both prioritised turnover statistics over market integrity, effectively enabling algorithmic strategies that generated impressive trading figures while systematically disadvantaging retail participants.
BSE's own troubles illustrate this dynamic perfectly. The exchange's shares rallied 140% before SEBI placed the company itself under surveillance, a revelation that even market infrastructure providers prioritised volume growth over investor protection.
Here's the regulatory challenge: prima facie, Jane Street's trades complied with existing SEBI rules. The firm exploited gaps in oversight rather than breaking explicit laws. All positions were within prescribed limits, all trades properly reported, all strategies used publicly available information. This represents regulatory arbitrage on an industrial scale, not criminal behaviour.
The regulator's new approach hopefully represents fundamental market redesign. Enhanced surveillance might monitor concentrated trades more closely while exchanges conduct periodic algorithmic audits. The likely shift from reactive to proactive oversight should mark a decisive break from the volume-at-any-cost mentality that enabled Jane Street's extraordinary profits.
If SEBI gets its investigation right, the implications can be unambiguous for institutional players. It means strategies exploiting microstructure advantages at retail expense will likely face enhanced scrutiny. The era of regulatory arbitrage in India's derivatives market might end, replaced by oversight prioritising genuine price discovery over trading volumes.
This expected transition will crimp activity and curtail lucrative strategies short-term. But, if done right, it will determine whether India's derivatives boom creates lasting wealth or merely redistributes it from retail investors to sophisticated algorithms.
SEBI's investigation signals India's choice between short-term volume metrics and long-term market integrity. SEBI should choose credibility over statistics, even if it means acknowledging the previous boom was built on systematic retail investor exploitation.
The Jane Street probe reveals what happens when regulators prioritise growth over governance. India built the world's largest options market by volume, but at the cost of creating a sophisticated profiteering machine. SEBI's belated recognition of these fundamental flaws offers hope that technological innovation and investor protection need not be mutually exclusive.