India’s GDP Rebase Shrinks the Denominator, Not the Dilemma

Upward tweaks to 2025-26 growth mask a smaller economic base and a post-pandemic expansion closer to 4–5%, reshaping the macro narrative.

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By Dhananjay Sinha

Dhananjay Sinha, CEO and Co-Head of Institutional Equities at Systematix Group, has over 25 years of experience in macroeconomics, strategy, and equity research. A prolific writer, Dhananjay is known for his data-driven views on markets, sectors, and cycles.

February 28, 2026 at 3:36 AM IST

India’s long-awaited rebasing of gross domestic product to 2022-23 offers a statistical upgrade to recent growth rates, yet it simultaneously redraws the scale of the economy on a smaller canvas. The revised series replaces the 2011-12 base year and lifts real GDP growth for 2025-26 to 7.6% from the earlier advance estimate of 7.4%, while nominal growth has been marked up to 8.6% from 8%. Real gross value added has been revised to 7.7% from 7.34%, with nominal GVA at 8.7% instead of 7.75%. Manufacturing has delivered the most visible surprise, with real growth now estimated at 11.5% compared with 7.3% earlier.

On the surface, the changes reinforce the impression of resilient momentum. Yet the more consequential story lies not in the incremental adjustment to annual growth rates but in the downward revision to the economy’s absolute size. For the comparable years from 2022-23 through 2025-26, nominal GDP has been scaled down by an average of 3.4%, while real GDP has been lowered by about 3.9%. The downgrades are consistent across years, with real GDP reduced by 3.29% in 2022-23, 4.6% in 2023-24, 4.1% in 2024-25 and 4.0% in 2025-26.

The methodology incorporates more granular survey data and refined indicators, and the GDP deflator has also been adjusted. It has been revised upward by 0.9% for 2023-24, lowered by 0.6% for 2024-25 and nudged up again by 0.4% for 2025-26. These deflator shifts have influenced real growth calculations, although the principal driver of the lower real GDP levels has been the scaling down of nominal output itself.

The adjustment becomes starker when one isolates domestic demand, excluding the external deficit. Nominal domestic demand is lower by an average of 5.8%, while real domestic demand is down by roughly 6.2%. At the same time, revisions to trade flows have narrowed the external deficit, reflecting upgrades to goods exports and a sharp downscaling of services imports. The implication is that earlier data likely overstated the strength of the domestic cycle relative to the external sector.

Viewed against the pre-pandemic benchmark of 2018-19, the revised trajectory suggests that India’s recovery has been more moderate than previously estimated. Nominal GDP since then has expanded at a compound annual growth rate of about 9.0%, compared with the earlier estimate of 9.5%. Real GDP growth over the same period now works out to roughly 4.8%, down from 5.4% in the old series. The revision, therefore, tempers the narrative of a rapid post-COVID acceleration and places underlying growth closer to a 4–5% range.

This denominator effect carries implications beyond statistical debates. A smaller nominal GDP base mechanically lifts key macro ratios, including the fiscal deficit and current account deficit as a share of output. Debt metrics, revenue buoyancy assessments and medium-term consolidation paths must now be interpreted against a reduced economic scale. Even if policy settings remain unchanged, the optics of sustainability alter when the denominator contracts.

Markets are unlikely to react sharply because equity valuations, credit conditions and corporate earnings expectations have already reflected softer demand dynamics. The revised series largely aligns official data with signals that investors had been pricing in, including muted top-line growth and uneven profitability. The more meaningful consequences are likely to emerge in policy calibration, where assumptions about potential growth shape both monetary stance and fiscal ambition.

For policymakers, the rebasing serves as a reminder that growth arithmetic cannot substitute for structural momentum. In an environment marked by rising protectionism, fragmented supply chains and rapid technological change, sustaining higher growth will require deeper domestic reform rather than reliance on statistical comfort. The revised series does not diminish India’s prospects, yet it narrows the margin for complacency by clarifying the scale from which the next phase of expansion must proceed.