As Washington Steps Back, Who Will Carry the World’s Climate Burden?

The US absence from COP30 was hardly unexpected. It followed Washington’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and its wider retreat from international climate diplomacy. The Trump administration has now gone further, announcing its withdrawal from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The shift is also visible at home. In February 2026, the Environmental Protection Agency rescinded its 2009 Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and repealed subsequent federal emissions standards for vehicles and engines.

These moves amount to a fundamental reversal of US climate policy. The consequences extend beyond American borders. A retreat by one of the world’s largest economies and historical emitters weakens international momentum, complicates climate policymaking and risks reducing the funding and political support available for research and technological development.

New Pressures
The EU has put climate policy at the heart of its economic agenda. The European Green Deal and the Fit for 55 package set a target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% from 1990 levels by 2030, followed by a 90% reduction by 2040 and climate neutrality by 2050.

But keeping those targets on track is becoming harder as Europe confronts a very different set of priorities. The changing transatlantic security relationship is pushing European countries to shoulder a greater share of their own defence burden. The reduction and planned phase-out of Russian energy imports have forced the EU to rethink energy security while accelerating diversification. Conflicts in the Middle East have added another layer of uncertainty to energy markets and the wider economic outlook.

Defence spending will make these trade-offs harder. NATO members have agreed to raise defence and security-related spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, a target that will place considerable pressure on European public finances. Germany has already relaxed constitutional fiscal constraints to create more room for defence expenditure, while several member states continue to contend with high debt and limited fiscal space.

Climate ambitions cannot be sustained by targets alone. They require continued public investment, and Europe may increasingly find itself having to balance them against competing strategic priorities.

China faces its own constraints. As the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, it has historically relied on emissions intensity and capacity targets rather than an absolute reduction commitment. Its latest pledge for 2035 is more ambitious, committing to cut economy-wide net emissions by 7% to 10% from their peak level, while its longer-term goal remains carbon neutrality by 2060.

China’s dominance in green technologies has nevertheless helped lower the cost of the global energy transition. But its own economy is under pressure, while US tariffs threaten to add further strain. China’s energy needs are still rising and, despite rapid growth in renewables, fossil fuels will remain part of the mix for years. If the economy continues to expand at 5% to 6%, emissions could remain high even as China adds vast amounts of clean-energy capacity.

India’s record is more encouraging. It ranked 10th in the 2025 Climate Change Performance Index, far ahead of China at 55th, and is considered to be on course to meet, and in some areas exceed, its Paris commitments. Renewable energy is expanding quickly, both through large grid-connected projects and smaller decentralised systems.

The complication is coal. It still accounts for a large share of India’s power generation, underscoring the difficult trade-off between keeping energy supplies reliable, supporting growth and cutting emissions.

A Shared Responsibility
The US retreat leaves the EU, China and India with a more difficult question: how much more of the global climate burden are they prepared to carry?

Their responses will necessarily differ. Europe needs to ensure that its climate-related trade measures do not leave developing economies feeling penalised for problems they did little to create, while doing more to provide them with finance and technology. China is in a position to make clean technologies cheaper and more widely available because of the scale of its manufacturing base. India, meanwhile, can deepen its role in renewable energy projects across the developing world while continuing to expand its own clean-energy capacity.

There is also scope for deeper cooperation on climate research, including carbon capture, utilisation and storage. The three major emitters can use their economic and diplomatic influence to keep the door open for a future US return to constructive global climate engagement.

The world cannot afford for climate leadership to become another casualty of geopolitical fragmentation. But Europe, China and India cannot simply replace the United States either. The global transition will require money, technology and political will on a scale that no single bloc can provide. The real test is whether America’s retreat pushes the remaining major powers towards greater cooperation, or leaves the world even more divided.